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things being equal, someone might be inclined to think that Aquinas is here
alluding to God as the governor of his creation. But since ‘agens naturale’ in
this discussion has until now meant some created natural agent, that would
constitute a very surprising and confusing shift in Aquinas’s terminology.99
Besides, in this case other things are not equal, as can be seen from the way
Aquinas distinguishes between natural and intellective agents at the and of
the argument: “Therefore, a natural agent tends toward what is for the
better. And, much more obviously, so does one that acts through intellect.”
And God, of course, is the paradigmatic, perfect intellective agent.100
III. BADNESS
1. The Badness Thesis
‘Badness’ is not a good word. It sounds faintly infantile, perhaps especially
now, at the end of the twentieth century. Still, ‘imperfection’ and its bland
companions are too broad to serve all the purposes of this investigation,
while ‘evil,’ ‘wickedness,’ ‘immorality,’ ‘sinfulness,’ and the like are even
more clearly too narrow. ‘Malum’ is almost the only word Aquinas uses,
adjectivally or as a nominalized adjective, for the central notion in III.4–15,
a series of chapters that has sometimes been called a treatise de malo.101 And
‘bad’ and ‘badness’ are the only English words that strike me as coming
close to playing all the roles Aquinas assigns to ‘malum.’ With that semi-sat-
isfactory bit of terminological equipment we can start an investigation of his
treatise on badness.
It begins in III.4 with what I’ll call the badness thesis: “Now on that
basis it is apparent that the badness in things, events, or states of affairs
occurs apart from the intention of their agents (Ex hoc autem apparet quod
malum in rebus incidit praeter intentionem agentium)” (3.1889). I’ve expanded
Aquinas’s one word ‘rebus’ into the phrase ‘things, events, or states of
affairs.’ It’s usually translated most safely as ‘things,’ but I think that the
generality implicit in it needs to be spelled out in that way here, and
occasionally elsewhere. Aquinas’s reference to “the badness in things,
events, or states of affairs” rather than merely badness for the agent appears
to generalize and objectify the kinds of badness at issue. The introductory
formula ‘on that basis,’ already familiar from the beginnings of many earlier
chapters in SCG I–III, refers in this case to the goodness thesis for which he
argued in the preceding chapter. If, as his first formulation of the goodness
thesis maintains, “every agent acts for what is good,” then no agent acts for
what is bad; and so the badness that does undeniably mar many things,
events, and states of affairs can’t be what their agents act for; it must
therefore occur apart from their agents’ intention. Viewed in this way, the
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badness thesis is a corollary of the goodness thesis.102 But that observation
on the apparent logical status of the badness thesis doesn’t explain Aqui-
nas’s taking  up badness,  especially in such detail, at this point in the
development of his natural theology, where it might look like a detour on
the road toward the conclusion that God is (somehow) creation’s single
ultimate end.
As we’ve seen, the notion of badness was introduced in Aquinas’s
chapters 2 and 3, but not in ways that seemed to call for immediate devel-
opment.103 So why does it become his topic here? It’s not hard to imagine
an explanation. Since the overall aim of III.2–63 is to show that all creation
is (somehow) directed toward God, and since III.3’s arguing that all created
things aim at what is good for them seems to constitute one important step
toward achieving that aim, the mere fact that some of the arguments of III.3
involved acknowledging the occurrence of bad results might give Aquinas
reason enough to turn and face that apparent difficulty at once. For how
could a world created and governed by perfectly good God,104 a world in
which every agent, intellective and natural alike, acts for what is good,
involve any badness at all?105
By now we have some reason to find Aquinas’s goodness thesis plausi-
ble, understanding it in the form in which he defends it in III.3, as the claim
that every agent in acting always intends to bring about what is good for the
agent. But the badness thesis seems on the face of it to be outrageously false,
even if (or perhaps especially if) we temporarily think only of human beings
as the agents at issue. For it seems to mean that none of the badness that
occurs so abundantly in the things, events, and states of affairs that make
up our world ever comes about as the intended result of any human being’s
action. There can’t have been any time in human history when such a claim
is likely to have been taken seriously, and every passing year carries its own
burden of what certainly looks like still more overwhelming counter-evi-
dence. So we also have some reason to wonder whether the badness thesis
really does mean what it seems to mean.
As a first step in examining and evaluating the badness thesis as it
stands, we can consider those not-so-rare occasions on which an agent, A,
recognizes as soon as the deed is done that what he apprehended as good
for himself turns out, quite apart from his intention, to be bad for himself.
For instance, the interesting-looking person A introduces himself to turns
out to be boring and offensive.106 Such disappointed-agent cases—cases of
mistaken apprehensions that are immediately recognized as such by the
disappointed agent—do appear to confirm the badness thesis.
But suppose that we shift our attention to satisfied-agent cases, cases in
which A is perfectly satisfied with the results of his action, convinced that its
results are indeed good for himself in just the way he intended. Won’t it
sometimes happen in satisfied-agent cases that the state of affairs A in-
tended to achieve and does achieve is clearly bad for someone else? A
urgently needs money, firmly believes that stealing it is the only way he can
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get it, and steals all of B’s money. A certainly seems to have intended and
acted for something good for himself, to have achieved just what he set out
to achieve, and to be perfectly satisfied with the result. The result is bad for
B, without a doubt; it counts as a little of the badness that really occurs in
things, events, or states of affairs. But that aspect of the outcome—that
badness—can also be seen in this example to have been apart from A’s
intention, which was directed only at something good (for A). If A could
have got the money easily without harming B or anyone else, he would have
done so. Viewed in that way, a very big sub-class of satisfied-agent cases that
might at first appear to provide evidence against the badness thesis can also
be understood to confirm it.
But aren’t there also satisfied-agent cases in which the resultant bad-
ness for someone or something other than the agent must be considered to
have been an integral part of what the agent intended, cases in which the
resultant badness for others  is essential to  the outcome that  the agent
apprehends as good for himself ? Revenge provides a handy paradigm. Cases
of revenge can’t be brought under the badness thesis simply by declaring
that the primary intention of the vengeful agent is to achieve what’s good
for the agent—justice, for instance—and that consequently the resultant
badness for the victim occurs apart from the agent’s intention. Agents
deliberating about their actions of revenge may, like King Lear, reject
various options just because their intended outcomes aren’t bad enough for
the targets of the vengeance.
I will have such revenges on you both
That all the world shall—I will do such things,—
What they are, yet I know not; but they shall be
The terrors of the earth.107
If the terrors of the earth don’t qualify as part of the badness that might
occur in things, events, and states of affairs—real, objective badness—what
would? And it seems that no one could with a straight face try to explain
that these terrors—whatever they might turn out to be—would be apart
from Lear’s intention. What’s more, although Lear doesn’t manage to carry
out his threats, his angry, vengeful intentions seem typical of the intentions
of ordinary, prosy, often-successful agents of revenge everywhere. So, if we
focus just on satisfied-agent cases of revenge as clear counter-instances, how
can we agree with Aquinas that the badness in things, events, or states of
affairs always occurs apart from the intention of their agents?
Of course, we can’t treat that question as merely rhetorical. But since
Aquinas presents some apparent counter-instances of his own and tries to
explain them away in III.5&6, we can and should postpone trying to answer
it. Meanwhile, it’s helpful to take account of two of this chapter’s four
arguments, which provide some important clarifications of the badness
thesis they’re intended to support.
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2. Clarifying the Thesis
In the second argument Aquinas supplies a three-level analysis of badness:
in effects, in the actions producing those effects, and in the principles or
sources of those actions.
A defect in an effect and in the action [producing that effect] is a result
of some defect in the principles of the action. (For instance, a congeni-
tal deformity results from some corruption of the semen, and lameness
results from a curvature of the leg bone.108) But an agent acts to the
extent to which it has an active power, not to the extent to which it
suffers a defect in the power; and the way it acts is the way it intends an
end. Therefore, it intends an end in a way that corresponds to the
power. Therefore, anything that results [from the action] but corre-
sponds to a defect in the power will be apart from the agent’s intention.
Now this [effect corresponding to a defect in the power] is bad. There-
fore, badness [in the effect] happens apart from [the agent’s] inten-
tion. (4.1891)
The principles or sources of an action are, for instance, the active power
that an agent must have in order to engage in that sort of action, and any
instrument, natural or artificial, that is required for exercising that
power.109 As Aquinas presents it here, this three-level analysis of badness
applies to some disappointed-agent cases, but it also seems to call for the
introduction of a third kind of case.
A defect is a shortcoming, a potentiality that isn’t appropriately actual-
ized at the appropriate stage of development or that has lost its appropriate
actualization—for example, a leg bone that failed to grow properly or that
was injured after having developed. And, as we’ve seen Aquinas claiming,
“badness is found only in  a potentiality that falls  short  of  [complete]
actuality” (3.1883).110 A defect in the effect is a result of a defect in the
action, which is a result of a defect in the principles of the action. Where
walking is the effect and limping is the defect in it, an explanatory defect
must be found in the action producing that effect—moving one’s body in
a certain way—and that defect must in turn be explained by a defect in the
active powers required for that sort of moving or in the requisite natural
instruments—for example, bones and muscles.
Aquinas’s example of the lame person isn’t a satisfied-agent case, and
it’s almost as clearly not a disappointed-agent case either, since lameness
brought about by a curvature of the leg bone is not the sort of defect that’s
likely to come as a surprise to an agent who intends to walk normally.
Congenitally lame people (and lame people typically) are instances of what
might be called the admittedly-defective-agent case. Since very many actions
and effects that are objectively recognized as defective in some respect are
produced by agents who would readily acknowledge the defects in their
relevant principles of action, the admittedly-defective-agent case is an im-
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portant supplement to the two cases already identified. The agent impaired
by a curvature of her leg bone intends to walk to the best of her ability,
knowing very well the defect in her principles of action. She can’t seriously
intend to walk without limping, but it makes good sense to say that she
doesn’t intend the limp in her walk (as an unimpaired actress might intend
to limp in playing a part).
Analogously, a piano student might intend to play a Beethoven sonata
to the best of her ability. Suppose that she does just that, but it’s a bad
performance. She didn’t intend to play the sonata badly, but she knew that
even if she played it as well as she could, there would be defects in the effect.
We can suppose that she played it better than she ever had before, and that
she’s pleased about that. But it was still a flawed performance, and she
knows it. Considered just as the best she could do, her action is precisely
what she intended. What’s bad about it really is apart from her intention.
And so admittedly-defective-agent cases subjected to Aquinas’s three-level
analysis also confirm the badness thesis.
Defects in an agent’s principles of action are very often well known to
the agent, as in these examples of admittedly defective agents. But even if
the only principles of action at issue are the immediately relevant active
powers or instruments (as in these examples), a long-standing defect in
them may have gone unnoticed by the agent, or a defect may occur sud-
denly and unexpectedly. In such circumstances Aquinas’s analysis as spelled
out in 4.1891 applies to disappointed-agent cases as well. Suppose that A
intends to throw the ball to B so that B can easily catch it. A wouldn’t form
that intention without believing that he has the power to carry it out—that
is, A “intends an end in a way that corresponds to the power.” But suppose
that A is surprised and disappointed to discover that he isn’t strong enough
to throw the ball that far. Since A “acts to the extent to which he has an active
power, not to the extent to which he suffers a defect in the power,” and since
“the way the agent acts is the way he intends an end,” the disappointing
badness in the effect clearly does occur apart from A’s intention. A’s acting,
strictly so-called, is his throwing the ball; A’s failing to throw the ball all the
way to B is not his acting but the defect in his acting, which stems from a
hitherto-unrecognized defect in A’s principles of action. More confirma-
tion for the badness thesis.
But suppose a vengeful A intends to throw the ball at B hard enough
to hurt him, and A succeeds. If the badness in this satisfied-agent case is also
going to be analyzed as a defect, the principle of action in which the
initiating defect is found is going to have to lie beyond the immediately
relevant active powers, on a fourth level of which A is now oblivious (and
which Aquinas’s analysis has so far not revealed).111 As far as this A is
concerned, the three-level analysis of defects introduced in 4.1891 would
disclose no defect at all in his act of revenge, the badness in which seems
clearly not to occur apart from A’s intention.
All such apparent counter-instances to the badness thesis could be
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turned aside if the thesis were weakened in a way that would make it more
precisely a corollary of the goodness thesis Aquinas actually argues for,
which, as we’ve seen, turns out to be a claim only about what is good for the
agent. We might weaken the badness thesis and align it more closely with the
goodness thesis if we revised it to look like this, for instance: Any aspect of
things, events, or states of affairs that is perceived by their agents as bad for
their agents occurs apart from the intention of their agents. I don’t think
that this weakened version is unquestionably true, but it certainly would be
easier to support than the thesis we’ve been considering. Satisfied-agent
cases of revenge wouldn’t count against the weakened version in any way,
nor would the weakened version suggest any of the misgivings I’ve been
raising against the thesis as Aquinas presents it in 4.1889: “The badness in
things, events, or states of affairs occurs apart from the intention of [their]
agents.” But if he means no more than what the relativized, weakened
version expresses, he ought not to have expressed the thesis so generally
and objectively. Moreover, while the relativistic character of his goodness
thesis was revealed almost at once, in the first argument supporting it (in
3.1879), none of the arguments we’ve considered for the badness thesis
have indicated that it’s to be given a relativistic interpretation.112 Finally, the
one supporting argument still to be considered seems to show that it is to
be interpreted just as objectively and generally as Aquinas’s wording of it
suggests, as we’ll now see. In that case, it will of course not be a corollary of
the relativistic goodness thesis, and it will remain vulnerable to the counter-
instances and misgivings that have so far been raised against it.
3. The Most Fundamental Application of the Thesis
Aquinas’s first, perfunctory supporting argument (4.1890) applies indiffer-
ently to intellective and natural agents,113 the fourth (4.1893) is expressly
concerned with intellective agents like us,114 and the second (4.1891) seems
to be appropriately considered in terms of intellective agents, as we’ve seen.
His third argument, however, is expressly and almost exclusively concerned
with inanimate natural agents (and patients) in ways that reveal his concep-
tion of the manifestation of badness in the most fundamental stratum of
created being:
The movement of what is movable and its mover’s moving [of it] tend
toward the same [end].115 Now what is movable tends per se toward what
is good; it is [only] per accidens and apart from intention that it tends
toward what is bad. This is especially apparent in connection with
generation and corruption. For matter that is under one form is in a
state of potentiality to another form and to the privation of the form it
now has. (4.1892)
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Here, near the beginning of this long argument, it’s already apparent that
its focus is on the most basic things, events, and states of affairs that make
up the physical world. Matter as Aquinas conceives of it is completely
passive, the fundamental patient, the paradigm of what is always and essen-
tially movable and never itself a mover of anything.116 And, as we’ve seen,
his explanation of generation/corruption is in terms of matter’s potentiali-
ties being actualized in the possession/privation of various forms.117
The example Aquinas provides at this point in the argument is drawn
from antiquated natural science, but it can easily be recast, retaining much
of his language.118 For instance, since marble is metamorphosed lime-
stone, we can say of one cubic foot of limestone at the beginning of the
process of metamorphosis that it is in a state of potentiality both to the
privation of the substantial form of limestone and to the possession of
the substantial form of marble. And such a transmutation of the matter
that now has the form of limestone is terminated in both the privation
and the possession at once: in the possession of the form of marble in
so far as a certain quantity of marble is generated, of course, but also in
the privation of the form of limestone in so far as the cubic foot of lime-
stone is corrupted.119
Now, as we’ve already seen, Aquinas maintains that “all natural agents, to
the extent of their power, resist corruption, which is bad for each and every
thing” (3.1885).120 And his argument at this stage seems to have presented
matter as disposed equally toward the fundamental goodness of acquiring a
substantial form in generation and the fundamental badness of losing a sub-
stantial form in corruption. But the argument already includes the claims
that “what is movable”—for example, matter—“tends per se toward what is
good,” and that “it is [only] per accidens and apart from intention that it tends
toward what is bad.” And so he has to explain how these claims apply to his
analysis of a transmutation such as limestone’s metamorphosis into marble.
“However, matter’s intention and appetite is not for the privation but
for the  form.  For  it doesn’t tend  toward what is impossible, and  it is
impossible for there to be mere matter, under a privation of being. On the
other hand, matter’s being under a form is possible. Therefore, the fact that
matter terminates in a privation is apart from [its] intention, although it
does terminate in it in so far as it achieves the form it intends, from which
the privation of the other form necessarily results. Therefore, the transmu-
tation of matter in generation and corruption is per se ordered toward the
form, while the [per accidens] privation results apart from intention”
(4.1892).121 In creation’s lowest metaphysical stratum goodness is mani-
fested as matter’s actualization, its possessing some substantial form or
other.122 Consequently, the badness contrary to that goodness is manifested
as matter’s being deprived of the substantial form it had; and that kind of
badness is an inevitable per accidens concomitant of absolutely every substan-
tial transformation. No rational being can even disapprove of, much less
condemn, most of the badness of corruption and privation that is ubiqui-
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tous in that way and is never found apart from the corresponding goodness
of generation and possession.123 Still, even in this substratum, where neither
intellective agents nor even living natural agents need be considered, Aqui-
nas applies his badness thesis. For “matter’s intention and appetite is not for
the privation but for the form,” and so “the fact that matter terminates in a
privation is apart from its intention”; in short, “the privation”—the badness to
be found even in this substratum—“results apart from intention.” If this
application of the badness thesis is to make sense, Aquinas needs at least to
show us how to make sense of the notion of matter’s intention.
Formless matter—“mere matter, under a privation of being”—is prime
matter, “pure potentiality.”124 As a theoretical element of Aquinas’s Aristo-
telian metaphysics prime matter is indispensable; however, it can’t occur
just as such in nature because it’s logically impossible for unactualized pure
potentiality to exist in actuality. But, for every quantity of actually existent
(formed) matter, a loss of any form, considered just as such, is a change in
the direction of the loss of every form, which is the status of prime matter, a
status that is unattainable in reality. Now it is naturally impossible that
matter should have a natural appetite, or intention, or disposition for what
is impossible; “and it is impossible for there to be mere matter, under a
privation of being.” That’s why matter’s natural tendency, or intention, has
the opposite orientation, toward the possible. And so “the transmutation of
matter in generation and corruption is per se ordered toward the form.”
Consequently, the kind of badness that consists in the inevitable privation
of a form, which accompanies every acquisition of another form, is merely
the naturally necessitated concomitant of a kind of goodness and results
only per accidens, apart from matter’s natural intention.125
The remainder of this important third argument generalizes and sum-
marizes what has already been argued:
And it must occur similarly in connection with all [species of] move-
ment or change; and so in any movement or change there is generation
and corruption in a certain respect.126 (For instance, whenever some-
thing is altered from white to black, something white is corrupted and
something black comes to be.127) Now, matter’s being perfected
through a form and a potentiality’s being perfected through its proper
actuality (actum proprium) is good; but a potentiality’s being deprived of
the actuality it ought to have (actu debito) is bad.128 Therefore, every-
thing that is moved intends in its movement to achieve what is good;
but it [sometimes] achieves what is bad, apart from intention. There-
fore, since every agent and mover [also] tends toward what is good [as
was argued in III.3], what is bad comes about apart from the agent’s
intention. (4.1892)
Although the argument’s final conclusion again has to do with the inten-
tions of agents, the argument contributes to the universalizing of the good-
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ness and badness theses by applying them not just to agents but also to
(natural) patients, and especially to matter itself, the fundamental patient
in created reality.
Aquinas’s unwavering thoroughness in applying his badness thesis all
the way down to creation’s lowest metaphysical stratum illuminates his con-
ception of badness in a way that will help us understand his applications of it
to all the more familiar and more threatening kinds of badness, such as pain
and suffering, natural disasters, and moral evil. But this most fundamental
application of the thesis may also seem either to debase language or to strain
credulity. Can anyone seriously claim to discern badness in the geological
process that is on the one hand the generation of marble and on the other
hand the corruption of limestone? Or in the biological process that is on the
one hand the generation of healthy tissue in a newborn baby and on the
other hand the digestive corruption of its mother’s milk? Matter’s loss of the
substantial forms of limestone or of milk is entirely as natural as is its acquisi-
tion of the substantial forms of marble or of flesh and bone. And since we
think of those transmutations as improvements, why shouldn’t we evaluate
not just the acquisitional but also the privational aspects of those transmuta-
tions as good? More pointedly, aren’t we forced to recognize that the priva-
tional aspects, too, are indispensable to natural processes and therefore
clearly not in any sense apart from nature’s intention?
4. Challenging the Thesis
Those misgivings about Aquinas’s badness thesis are only the latest addi-
tions to a list that has been growing since we began considering the thesis.
So it is altogether appropriate that in the next, conjoint chapter 5&6 he
raises three objections that encapsulate all the misgivings I’ve expressed
and more besides, following them immediately with a further analysis of
badness on which he bases his rejoinders to the objections. His objections
are particularly effective because they grow out of undeniable, ordinary
characteristics of badness that seem to be either ignored or expressly con-
tradicted in his thesis.
The first of the objections might be called the argument from the
prevalence of badness. As we’ve already seen, it’s part of Aquinas’s concep-
tion of chance that “whatever happens apart from an agent’s intention is
said to be fortuitous and by chance” (5&6.1896).129 Therefore, if Aquinas’s
thesis is correct, at least well-informed, thoughtful people should describe
all badness as fortuitous and by chance; but they don’t: “the occurrence of
badness is not said to be fortuitous and by chance” (5&6.1896). Further-
more, as we’ve also seen, Aquinas’s second defining characteristic of a
chance event-type is that it happens very seldom;130 but badness happens
either
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always or very often. For in nature corruption is always adjoined to
generation. And even as regards agents that act through will, wrong-do-
ing (peccatum) happens very often; for it is as hard to act in accordance
with virtue as it is to find the center of a circle (as Aristotle says in Ethics
II [9, 1109a24–26]).131(5&6.1896)
Summing up the  prevalence argument: What happens apart from any
agent’s intention happens by chance, and what happens by chance happens
very seldom; but badness doesn’t happen very seldom, and so badness
doesn’t happen apart from any agent’s intention; and so the badness thesis
must be false.
I’ll call the second objection the argument from the voluntariness of
badness—an argument that comes close to raising the misgiving I found in
satisfied-agent cases of revenge.132
In Ethics III [7, 1113b14–17; b21–25; 1114a11–12] Aristotle expressly
says that malice (malitia) is voluntary. And he proves this by the fact that
a person voluntarily does unjust things and that it makes no sense [to
suppose] that a person voluntarily doing unjust acts does not will to be
unjust (or that a person voluntarily engaging in debauchery does not
will to be incontinent), and by the fact that lawgivers punish bad people
as doing bad things voluntarily. (5&6.1897)
It may seem odd that this voluntariness argument appeals to Aristotelian
authority for what would ordinarily be considered commonplace truths, but
that feature of it  is  made appropriate by what  seems to be Aquinas’s
astonishing  contradiction  of such truths in his badness  thesis. Agent’s
intention, the crucial notion in the thesis, isn’t mentioned in the body of the
voluntariness argument. But the argument plainly relies on the natural
assumption that nothing that an agent does voluntarily could be done apart
from  the  agent’s intention—an  assumption  that is brought  out in the
argument’s conclusion: “Therefore, badness is evidently not apart from
volition or intention” (5&6.1897).
The third and last of the three objections Aquinas raises here against
his own thesis is an argument from the naturalness of badness, one that
grows directly out of the most fundamental application of the thesis, as
we’ve just been seeing.
Every natural movement or change has an end that is intended by
nature. But corruption is a natural change, just like generation. There-
fore, its end, which is privation and has the defining characteristic of
badness, is intended by nature just as are form and goodness, which are
the end of generation. (5&6.1898)
And so, once again, it must be false that the badness in things, events, or
states of affairs occurs apart from the intention of their agents—whether
the agents at issue are intellective or natural.
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5. Elucidating the Thesis
These arguments from prevalence, from voluntariness, and from natural-
ness strike me as incorporating, explicitly or implicitly, the misgivings and
objections that are likely to have occurred to a careful reader of III.4 (and
III.3). It also seems to me that Aquinas has not provided an account of
badness (or of goodness) from which his solutions to these arguments
could be readily inferred—neither in the preceding four chapters of Book
III nor in the preceding two books of SCG. As if partially acknowledging this
situation, he prefaces his rejoinders to the three objections with a further
analysis of badness that constitutes an important supplement to everything
he’s said so far on these topics: “Now in order that the solution of those
arguments may be made clearer, we have to consider that badness can be
considered either in connection with some substance or in connection with
its action” (5&6.1899).
Aquinas devotes most of his supplementary analysis to the badness of
substances (S-badness), the sort with which his investigation so far has been
almost exclusively concerned. The badness of actions (A-badness) is obvi-
ously very important, especially in connection with morality, but his treat-
ment of it here is much briefer, as we’ll see. His fundamental criterion of
S-badness is very simple (and could be even simpler): a substance is bad (im-
perfect, defective) in some respect and to some extent if and only if “it lacks
something that [1] is natural for it and that [2] it ought (debet) to have”
(5&6.1899).133 He confirms this criterion by showing that it systematizes or-
dinary attitudes.134 Wings are no more [1] natural to a human being than
hands are to a bird, and so there’s nothing bad about the facts that human be-
ings don’t have wings and birds don’t have hands. Fair hair is [1] natural to a
human being, as bright coloration is to a bird; but since fair hair is no more
[2] required for every normal human being than bright coloration is for
every normal bird, there’s nothing bad about being a brunette or a peahen.
But, of course, “if a person doesn’t have hands, which it’s [1] natural for a hu-
man being to have and which a human being [2] must (debet) have if it’s com-
plete (perfectus),” that’s bad; although, as we’ve just been shown, “that’s
something that is not bad for a bird” (5&6.1899). As these examples indicate,
Aquinas’s distinction between [1] and [2] makes good sense. The distinction
does no work in his analysis of the badness of substances, however, since it’s
only a lack of something that a substance [2] must have in order to be a com-
plete, normal specimen that constitutes S-badness, and every type-[2] lack
must also be a type-[1] lack (though not vice versa). Consequently, although
Aquinas continues to employ both [1] and [2] in this discussion in helpful
ways, his criterion of S-badness could in theory be reduced to just a type-[2]
lack. But he does offer at least a terminological reduction of his own, when he
uses his analysis in terms of [1] and [2] to explain what has already seemed
apparent in his treatment of badness: “in privation understood properly and
strictly there is always the defining characteristic of badness,” because “every
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privation, if ‘privation’ is taken properly and strictly, is a privation of some-
thing that someone [or something] [1] is naturally suited to have and [2]
ought to have” (5&6.1899).135 On that basis Aquinas can now use just ‘priva-
tion’ to cover both type-[1] and type-[2] lacks.
More importantly, this strict sense of ‘privation’ enables him to supple-
ment the most fundamental application of the badness thesis in a way that
helps to make sense of it. His initial observation that the generation in-
volved in every substantial change is good while its inevitably concomitant
corruption is bad is essential to his account of badness. It even has a kind
of initial intuitive appeal. But it’s so rudimentary that it gives rise to such
apparent counter-examples as I raised regarding the “badness” of the cor-
ruption of mother’s milk—the privation of its substantial form—that is
simply a necessary condition of the generation of healthy tissue in the baby.
He can now refine the application so as to avoid that sort of absurdity.
Since matter is in potentiality to all forms, it is of course [1] naturally
suited to have them all. However, none of them is something that matter
[2] ought to have, since matter can be perfect in actuality without any
one of them you choose. (5&6.1900)
Consequently, matter’s lack of any one form at all is not, speaking strictly, a
privation for matter. When matter was here and there actualized by the form
of velociraptor and nowhere by the form of chickadee, it was no better and
no worse than it is now, when matter is here and there actualized by the
latter form and nowhere by the former.
To evaluate matter in this way is to assign matter a standpoint, to invite
the reader to consider the goodness and badness of the case from what
might be called matter’s point of view. Is the extinction of the dinosaurs bad
for matter? No. But Aquinas’s assigning of standpoints will show just as clearly
that the extinction of the dinosaurs is bad for the dinosaurs. And, as might be
expected by now, he applies this device all the way down, past living things
and ordinary non-living things to elemental forms:
However, each of those forms is something that some one of the things
that are constituted out of matter [2] ought to have. For matter cannot
be water unless it has the form of water, nor can it be fire without the
form of fire. Therefore, the privation of such a form, considered from
the standpoint of matter (comparata ad materiam), is not bad for matter;
but considered from the standpoint of the thing of which it is the form,
the privation is bad for it—as the privation of the form of fire is bad for
a fire,
which upon being deprived of that form is promptly extinguished
(5&6.1900). Considered from the standpoint of the thing whose substantial
form it is, the privation of a thing’s substantial form or of anything else that
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that thing [2] ought to have “will be bad unconditionally,” “because priva-
tions as well as possessions and forms are said to be only in so far as they are
in a subject” (5&6.1901a).136
But, as we’ve just been seeing, the thing that [2] ought to have that
form and all its normal accoutrements is not the only subject in which the
possession or the privation occurs. When the dinosaurs became extinct, the
privation of form occurred not just in the subjects that were the various
species of dinosaur, for each of which it was bad unconditionally, but also
in the genus animal, a subject for which that mass extinction happened not
to be bad unconditionally (since many other species of animals happened
to survive). And that same privation occurred most fundamentally in matter
itself, the subject for which that privation is not bad at all.
However, if a privation is not bad considered from the standpoint of
the subject in which it is, then it will be bad for something and not
unconditionally. . . . Therefore, [considered just as such,] a human
being’s being deprived of a hand is unconditionally bad, but [some]
matter’s137 being deprived of the form of air [e.g., by the action of
fire138] is not bad unconditionally although bad for the air.139
(5&6.1901a)
Viewed against the background of Aquinas’s detailed analysis of bad-
ness in substances, his analysis of badness in actions (A-badness) looks
surprisingly short. In some respects the discrepancy in length is justified.
For instance, in his analysis of A-badness he refers simply to a type-[2] lack,
a simplification he’s entitled to, as we’ve seen. And we are entitled to expect
that much of what he had to say about S-badness will apply, mutatis mutandis,
to fill out his short account of A-badness. That expectation is in fact justi-
fied, but his use of new terminology here may well put it in doubt.
Now where action is concerned a privation of the ordering or well-
adaptedness (ordinis aut commensurationis) that the action [2] ought to
have is bad for the action. And since for each and every action there is
an ordering and a well-adaptedness that it ought to have, it’s necessary
that that sort of privation in action is unconditionally bad. (5&6.1901b)
We’ve already seen Aquinas using the notion of ordering in connection
with  action, but  what’s meant by ‘well-adaptedness’ here?140 The  most
pertinent explanation of an action’s well-adaptedness is the one that Aqui-
nas supplies in the detailed analysis of action he develops in the course of
his most systematic investigation of morality, in ST IaIIae:
Everything that is ordered toward an end must be proportioned to that
end, and an action is proportioned to an end on the basis of a kind of
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well-adaptedness that is effected through the circumstances that the
action ought to have.141 (7.2c)
As might be expected, where moral badness is concerned, the privation of
the requisite ordering or well-adaptedness is associated with bad reasoning
on the part of the agent’s intellect guiding the agent’s will:142 “vices and sins
. . . are deprived of the well-adaptedness of reason that they ought to
have—[but] deprived in such a way that reason’s ordering is not entirely
removed from them”143 (ST IaIIae.73.2c).144 However, although considera-
tions of ordering and well-adaptedness are important to Aquinas’s moral
evaluation of actions, they seem to be only tangentially relevant to the ways
in which he deals with A-badness in his rejoinders to the three objections.
In those rejoinders, as we’ll see, he introduces additional bases on which to
evaluate actions, morally and otherwise, along with further elucidation of
concepts that are essential to his account.
6. Defending and Refining the Thesis
Aquinas’s opening move in dealing with the first objection, the prevalence
argument, amounts to refining the frequency condition in his account of
chance.145 To qualify as genuinely fortuitous, an outcome must be some-
thing that happens “very seldom” in connection with the type of action
being performed by a particular agent on a particular occasion, as well as
something that happens “apart from the agent’s intention” on that occa-
sion—for example, drunkenness as a result of wine-tasting. But if there is a
particular agent such that “what is apart from intention [in such an action
of his] is something that always or often results from what is intended, then
it will not happen fortuitously or by chance” (5&6.1902). This sensible
refinement of the frequency condition enables Aquinas to undermine the
prevalence argument by amending its first premise: What happens as a
result of an agent’s action but apart from the agent’s intention happens by
chance only if the unintended consequence is not also a regular consequence of the
agent’s performance of an action of that type.
This refinement obviously applies most readily, and very usefully, to
unintended consequences of human actions, as is shown by the example of
unintended but predictable drunkenness with which Aquinas introduces it.
But the prevalence argument carefully applied its objection not only to
volitional action, which goes bad very often, but also to the fundamental
natural action of generation or transmutation, which, as Aquinas has ex-
plained, always involves “the badness of natural corruption” (5&6.1903).
His refined frequency condition now provides a way around the absurdity
of classifying the inevitable as fortuitous. The corruption that is concomi-
tant with intended generation really is almost always apart from the inten-
tion of the generating agent. We, for instance, intend only to feed ourselves,
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and not also to corrupt the food we eat. But that sort of natural corruption
is necessitated, not fortuitous: it “always results, because [the acquisition] of
one form is always connected with the privation of another” (5&6.1903).
And so, in the light of the refined frequency condition, the first apparent
absurdity brought out in the prevalence argument is dispelled. What hap-
pens by chance does happen very seldom, in a sense that has now been
more fully explained; but, for reasons that have now been brought out, it’s
not true that whatever happens apart from any agent’s intention happens
by chance. The badness of natural corruption occurs both apart from the
intention of the generating agent and necessarily.
Of course, not all natural badness is of that most fundamental, all-per-
vasive sort. We also encounter “the sort of privation that deprives what is
generated of what it ought to have . . . , as in the case of congenital
deformities” (5&6.1903). And since cases of that sort do ordinarily satisfy
even the refined conditions of chance occurrences, they typically “will be by
chance, as well as unconditionally bad” for the children whose deformities
they are (5&6.1903).146 We’ve already seen that Aquinas ascribes the bad-
ness of congenital deformities to a defect in one or more of the principles
of reproductive action: “some corruption of the semen,” or what we would
describe as genetic defects.147 And so this kind of case leads him from the
consideration of S-badness that has concerned him so far in the prevalence
argument to a consideration of A-badness in natural action.
He begins by explaining it in the general terms of his three-level
analysis: “the badness of action in the case of natural agents occurs as a
result of a defect in active power” (5&6.1904).148 But his refined frequency
condition again provides the basis for a significant distinction: “this sort of
badness does result apart from [the agent’s] intention. However, if such an
agent suffers that defect of power either always or often, this sort of badness
will not be by chance, because it results necessarily from that sort of agent”
(5&6.1904).149 Even in the thirteenth century, before any detection of
genetic defects in prospective parents was possible, a pattern of birth de-
fects in a family would have been enough to alter the perceived status of
what would otherwise have been considered chance events, to transform
natural into moral badness, to render blameworthy what would otherwise
have been only deplorable, even if devastating.
This consideration of A-badness is illuminating, but it does not yet
address the prevalence argument’s charge that “even as regards agents that
act through will, wrong-doing happens very often”, and so it cannot plausi-
bly be described as apart from the agent’s intention. As a first move toward
squaring this sad truth with his goodness thesis—that every agent always
acts for something good—Aquinas introduces an important refinement of
his account of action and intention.150 Actions, he observes, must all take
place in the realm of particulars. Consequently, when a voluntary agent
deliberates about an action, “it’s not universals that move [the agent], but
rather particulars”; and so, in agents concerned with the particular things,
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events, and states of affairs that provide the context for action, “the inten-
tion is for some particular good” (5&6.1905).
Some action-types are such that “wrong-doing results  very seldom
from what the agent intends—as when someone shooting at a bird kills
a man”; and that sort of outcome apart from the agent’s intention simply
is “bad by chance” (5&6.1905). But there are also many action-types such
that the particular “good that is intended is either always or often con-
ceptually (secundum rationem) conjoined with the privation of some good.
And then moral badness follows either always or often” (5&6.1905). Aqui-
nas’s example is of “someone who wants to use a woman for pleasure.”
This intended particular good of the agent’s pleasure is conceptually con-
joined with the privation of other particular goods and of certain universal
goods as well, such as justice, chastity, or respect for persons.151 A con-
ceptually conjoined privation of good is conjoined with the action-type and
not just with some defect in some particular agent’s active power, and so
no rational agent can be excused for failing to see the badness beyond
the particular good he or she intends in such a case.152 Even if the con-
ceptually conjoined privation of good is quite apart from the agent’s in-
tention, this sort of badness, unlike the hunting accident, “does not result
by chance” (5&6.1905).
Why, then, does such wrong-doing happen “very often”? What explains
the fact that an ordinarily rational agent frequently overlooks the badness
conceptually conjoined with the particular good he or she intends—espe-
cially since, as Aquinas observes, “a privation of some good is a conceptual
consequence of very many such goods” (5&6.1906)? “The fact that someone
may very often intend the sort of [particular] goods of which privations of
good are conceptual consequences results from the fact that very many
people live by their senses. For the things that we can sense are presented
to us plainly and move us more effectively in connection with particulars,
with which activity is concerned” (5&6.1906).153
Aquinas’s thorough, effective rejoinder to the prevalence argument
provides a background against which his rejoinder to the second objection,
the argument from the voluntariness of badness, may look peculiar. It
depends on drawing a sharp distinction between volition and intention,
which, as we’ve seen, were not distinguished in the voluntariness argument
itself. “Intention,” Aquinas now tells us, “has to do with an ultimate end, which
a person wills for its own sake. Volition, on the other hand, has to do also
with what a person wills for the sake of something else, even if he wouldn’t
will it unconditionally” (5&6.1907). And he clarifies the distinction with a
familiar Aristotelian example:154
a person who throws a cargo into the sea because of [considerations of]
safety doesn’t intend the jettisoning of the cargo, but rather the safety
[of the ship]; and he wills the jettisoning of the cargo—not uncondi-
tionally, but because of [considerations of] safety.155 (5&6.1907)
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The distinction is clear enough for present purposes and obviously useful.
But how well does this account of intention suit the sorts of things
Aquinas has been saying about intention so far, especially in his rejoinder
to the prevalence argument? He has, after all, just been alluding to agents
whose  intended particular  goods are “enjoying the  sweetness of  wine”
(5&6.1902), or experiencing sexual pleasure (5&6.1905). It’s easy to grant
that each of these particular goods is an end “which a person wills for its own
sake,” but it will be only in that weak, relativized sense that either of those
ends could count as “ultimate” for those agents.156 And the third example of
an intended particular good Aquinas uses in his rejoinder to the prevalence
argument seems not to conform to even that accommodating interpreta-
tion of this account of intention: cases in which “wrong-doing results very
seldom from what the agent intends—as when someone shooting at a bird
kills a man” (5&6.1905). This agent’s intention is the killing of the bird. But
since he’s a thirteenth-century hunter and not a nineteenth-century aristo-
crat, the killing of the bird is surely not what the hunter wills for its own sake,
not his ultimate end even in that weak, relativized sense. That Aquinas
himself sometimes ignores his precise sense of ‘intention’ seems likely (and
unsurprising).
Still, it is just that precise sense on which his rejoinder to the voluntari-
ness argument rests:
even though what is bad [in human action] is apart from intention, it is
nonetheless voluntary, as the second argument proposes: not per se,
however, but voluntary per accidens. . . . [F]or the sake of some sensory
good to be attained a person wills to do a disordered action, not
intending the disorder or willing it unconditionally, but rather [only] for
the sake of that good. And so malice and wrong-doing are said to be
voluntary in the same sense as throwing the cargo into the sea is said
to be voluntary. (5&6.1907)
The emotions of the person jettisoning the cargo must be more like those
of a parent disciplining a beloved child than like those of a satisfied agent
of revenge, but emotions aren’t at issue here. Aquinas’s intention/volition
distinction dispels the misgiving raised by revenge in the typical case in
which the vengeful agent’s “ultimate” end is the particular good of retri-
bution, perhaps associated with the universal good of justice, while the
badness, the harm to the victim, is what the agent wills only per accidens,
only conditionally, only for the sake of the intended good. This clinically
detached analysis is usefully applicable beyond revenge, even to cases of
the most depraved, unprovoked sadism, in which the particular good of
the agent’s pleasure is really all that’s intended, all that’s willed for its own
sake.157
The third objection, the argument from the naturalness of badness, is
as exclusively concerned with non-voluntary agents as the second is with
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voluntary agents; but Aquinas begins his rejoinder to the naturalness argu-
ment with the claim that its solution “is clear in the same way” (5&6.1908).
He can’t mean that its solution is based on the intention/volition distinc-
tion. We are familiar by now with his very wide application of ‘intention,’
but he never ascribes volition to non-cognitive, inanimate agents. His claim
about the sameness of this third solution is justified at a more general level,
on the basis of an analogous distinction between absolute and accidental
intention, as he shows in his analysis of a natural process that might now be
recognized as evaporation:
The change involved in corruption is never found without the change
involved in generation; consequently, neither is the end involved in
corruption found without the end involved in generation. Therefore,
nature does not intend the end involved in corruption apart from the
end involved in generation, but rather both at once. For nature’s absolute
intention is not that the water not exist but rather that the air exist—the
air whose existence precludes the water’s existence. Therefore, it is
the air’s existing that nature intends as such, while it intends the water’s
not existing only in so far as that is conjoined with the air’s existing. In
this way, therefore, nature does not intend privations as such but [only]
accidentally. Forms, however, it does intend as such.158 (5&6.1908)
This rejoinder’s assumption that nature is universally orientated toward
being and hence toward goodness rests on Aquinas’s account of the tran-
scendental identity of being and goodness, which he develops in detail
elsewhere159 and occasionally alludes to in this context.160
7. What Badness Could Not Be
That only God, or God’s essence, is “being itself” is one of the cornerstones
of Aquinas’s natural theology.161 That only God, or God’s essence, is “good-
ness itself” is that same cornerstone viewed from another angle.162 And so
it’s one of the first principles of Aquinas’s theistic metaphysics that there is
exactly one essence that is good in itself and as such foundational to all
created goodness and being.163 “However,” he says, “on the basis of these
considerations [of the badness thesis] it’s apparent that no essence is bad in
itself” (7.1910).
In chapter 7, he offers eight arguments in support of that new thesis,
and six more in the conjoint chapter 8&9. Some of them contribute to an
understanding of his theory of badness, as we’ll see. But his very first, very
short argument in chapter 7 is enough by itself to show just why the new
thesis is indeed apparent on the basis of his considerations of the badness
thesis.
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For, as was said [in 5&6.1899], badness is nothing other than a privation
of that which is [1] natural for someone or something and which it [2]
ought to have. . . . A privation, however, is not an essence, but is rather
a negation in a substance.164 (7.1911)
That is, S-badness is the absence from a particular substance of something
that a substance of that type must have in order to be normal or complete.
A privation is no more an essence than a compound fracture is a bone, but
a privation can no more occur without an  essence than a compound
fracture can occur without a bone. “Therefore, badness is not an essence in
things, events, or states of affairs” (7.1911).
The familiarity of that line by this stage is likely to lead a careful reader
to think that this new thesis doesn’t need all the support Aquinas provides
for it—at any rate not these days, when Manicheism no longer worries
anyone. But the Manichean cosmic dualism of balanced good and evil
principles was still a theological force to be reckoned with when Aquinas
was writing SCG, soon after the Albigensian Crusade against the Cathars,
who were heavily influenced by Manicheism. The motivation for Aquinas’s
painstaking refutation of the claim that badness is an essence is revealed in
the concluding paragraph of his chapter 7: “Now on this basis we rule out
the mistake made by the Manichees, who claim that some things are bad in
their very natures” or essences (7.1920).165
The fifth of chapter 7’s eight arguments provides the fullest support
for the new thesis, in a way that treats S-badness in terms that are by now
familiar but with new thoroughness:
Every essence is [1] natural to some thing. For if the thing is in the
category of substance, then its essence is the very nature of the thing.
On the other hand, if it is in a category of accident [—such as quality or
quantity—] then it must be caused by the principles of some substance,
and in that way it will be [1] natural to that substance. (It may, however,
not be natural to some other substance—as heat [in the category of
quality] is natural to fire although not natural to water.166) But what-
ever is bad in itself cannot be natural to anything, since being a privation
of that which [1] naturally inheres in something and [2] is [naturally]
owed to it belongs to the defining characteristic of badness. Therefore,
badness, since it is a privation of [1] what is natural, cannot be natural
to anything. For that reason, too, whatever inheres in something natu-
rally is good for it—and bad for it if it is lacking. Therefore, no essence
is bad in itself.167 (7.1915)
In chapter 8&9, Aquinas marshals six objections against his thesis that
no essence is bad in itself, followed by his rejoinders to them. The thesis has
already been well argued within Aquinas’s privation-theory of badness, and
these objections themselves seem unthreatening. But some of his rejoinders
introduce new and important parts of the theory. The first objection, for
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instance, relies on a technicality regarding the formalities of specification
in order to try to show that badness itself “is an essence, and [1] natural to
some things, events, and states of affairs,” basing that conclusion on a view
Aquinas shares:
[that] badness is a specifying differentia in some genera—in habits, for
instance, and in actions properly subject to moral evaluation (actibus morali-
bus).168 For just as a virtue, considered in respect of its species, is a good
habit, so is the vice that is contrary to it a bad habit, considered in respect
of its species. And the same sort of thing holds as regards the actions
associated with virtues and with vices. (8&9.1922)
It seems open to Aquinas to dismiss this objection merely by pointing
out that what makes a vice specifically bad is just its privation of that aspect
of the contrasting virtue which makes the virtue specifically good—as in
stinginess and liberality, for instance. Instead, he takes the necessity of
replying to it as an occasion for widening and deepening his subsidiary
account of moral badness (and goodness). An action derives its species from
the active principle that gives rise to it. So, for instance, a natural action is
specified as heating just because its natural principle has the form of heat.
But the essential active principle of moral and immoral actions is will, and
a will has no specifying form of its own.169 Instead, the essential active
principle of an action properly subject to moral evaluation is a will-with-an-
object. But, as we’ve seen, “a will’s object is an end, and something good.
For that reason, actions properly subject to moral evaluation derive their
species” not from their active principle’s unique fixed form, but rather
“from an end” (8&9.1928)—where a will’s end on one or another particular
occasion of action might be thought of as providing that active principle
with its specifying form for that occasion.
Since will’s object is invariably “an end, and something good,” these
observations so far may seem only to make it harder to understand how
Aquinas thinks that some human actions (and the habits that help to
govern them) will be correctly specified as bad. But it shouldn’t come as a
surprise to find that the explanation depends on evaluating the end in
different respects. A human agent’s end will be evaluated as good or bad in
an overarching, universal respect depending on the degree to which it
contributes to the full actualization of the agent’s specifying potentialities
as a rational being.
The primary differentiae as regards actions and habits that are properly
subject to moral evaluation must be goodness and badness, because
goodness and badness are spoken of in respect of a universal ordering
toward an end or in respect of a privation of [that] ordering. Now for
each single genus there must be a single primary measure, and the
measure of morality is reason.
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That is, the measure of moral goodness and badness for human beings is
rationality, the differentia of the human species and the aspect of humanity
that makes human beings and their actions and habits properly subject to
moral evaluation. Aquinas continues:
Therefore, some things are called good or bad in morality on the basis
of reason’s end. Therefore, in morality, whatever gets its species from an
end that is in accordance with reason is called good in respect of its species,
while whatever gets its species from an end contrary to reason’s end is
called bad in respect of its species. (8&9.1928)
Any form of overindulgence, as that designation indicates, “gets its
species from an end contrary to reason’s end” and so is “bad in respect of its
species.” Nonetheless, any particular overindulgent end, “even though it
annuls reason’s end,” is, like every end of every volition, “something good—for
example, what gives sensory pleasure, or something else of that sort”
(8&9.1928). It would undercut both Aquinas’s goodness thesis and his
badness thesis if this certifying of a will’s particular irrational end as good
meant no more than that the agent’s reason evaluates it incorrectly. And so
he goes on to explain that things, events, and states of affairs that give
sensory pleasure
are good for some animals, and even, when they’re moderated in
accordance with reason, for a human being. And what’s bad for one
animal or human being can be good for another. So not even badness
considered as a specifying differentia in the genus of morality implies anything
bad in respect of its essence. Instead, it implies something that is good in
itself but bad for a human being in so far as it is a privation of the ordering
of reason, which is a human being’s goodness. (8&9.1928)
And so, as Aquinas concludes in another of these rejoinders,
moral badness is both a genus and a differentia—not in so far as it is a
privation of the good of reason (because of which it is called badness),
but in virtue of the nature of the action or habit that is ordered toward
an end that is opposed to reason’s [naturally] appropriate (debito) end.
(8&9.1930)
But, since “everything that acts is a real thing,” as the fourth objection
notes, and since Aquinas’s privation-theory of badness denies that badness,
considered just as such, is something real in its own right, there seems to be
a difficulty over this recognition of badness as a genus and differentia of
action. Aquinas agrees, of course, that
a privation, considered just as such, is not the principle of any action.
That’s why Dionysius says quite correctly (in Chapter IV [§31.242] of
De divinis nominibus) that badness opposes goodness only by the power
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of goodness, while in itself it is powerless and weak—the principle of
no action, so to speak.170 (8&9.1931)
Nonetheless, he explains,
when the privation associated with a contrary form and a contrary end
is added to a form and end that have the defining characteristic of
goodness, the action that results from such a [composite] form and
end is attributed to the privation and the badness—per accidens, of
course, [since the privational form can be an active principle only in
virtue of its parasitic status], only by the power of goodness.171
(8&9.1931)
8. How Goodness is the Cause of Badness in Nature
Continuing that line of thought, Aquinas is led to argue for a thesis that,
taken out of context, has a distinctly counter-intuitive ring to it: “what is bad
is caused only by what is good” (10.1934). But at this advanced stage of the
development of his privation theory he’s within his rights to say that this
thesis “can be inferred from things already put forward” (10.1934). For
even “if the cause of something bad is badness” at some relatively superficial
level, “goodness itself must be the primary cause of anything bad” because
(as we’ve just been seeing) “badness acts only by the power of goodness”
(10.1935).
Most of the long chapter 10 Aquinas devotes to this thesis is, appropri-
ately, given over to explaining just how goodness must be the cause of
badness, in nature and in morality. At the outset of the chapter he offers
only four arguments in direct support of the thesis, and the one that draws
most instructively on things already put forward is the third (10.1937):
“Whatever is properly and per se the cause of anything tends toward the
effect that is proper to it”—as fire tends toward heating, for instance.
Therefore, if something bad [considered just as such] were per se the
cause of anything, then it would tend toward its proper effect—namely,
something bad. But that’s false, for it was shown [in III.3] that every
agent intends something good.172
The goodness thesis applies even to an agent that is itself in some respect
or other something bad. “Therefore, what is bad [considered just as such]
is not per se the cause of anything, but only per accidens,” as we’ve seen
Aquinas explain more than once.173 Only something that is itself a primary
feature of reality, as opposed to a real defect in some primary feature of
reality, can be a per se cause “But every per accidens cause is traced back to a
per se cause. Therefore, what is bad is caused by what is good.” This combi-
nation of per se and per accidens causation is at the center of Aquinas’s
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explanation of the occurrence of badness, and it needs the detailed analysis
he now provides for it.
A per se cause is a real agent, a real power, a real instrument, real
(proximate) matter, a real form, considered just as such; and all such
instances of being, considered just as such, are good. But we’ve just been told
that every bad effect has some such good thing as its per se cause, in the sense
that some such good primary feature of reality must be the positive anchor
to which the negative bad effect is traced in a fuller causal explanation.174
Explaining the badness of limping as the effect of the badness of the bone’s
curvature is enough for most practical purposes. But a fuller explanation
will account not merely for the defect in the walking but also for the walking
without which the defect couldn’t occur; and that will involve a reference
to the lame person’s power of walking, something good that is the per se
cause of the motion that happens to be impaired. Still, the mode of causation
in which something bad is caused by something good must be per accidens.
“Bad and good are opposites, but one of a pair of opposites cannot be the
cause of the other except per accidens . . . ; and so it follows that what is good
can be an active cause of what is bad only per accidens” (10.1939)—the way
an agent’s power of walking, altogether unimpaired in itself, can be an
active cause of limping per accidens in virtue of imparting motion to a
defective instrument.175
On this basis Aquinas develops an etiology of badness, first in nature
and then in morality. The badness that is brought about per accidens in
nature stems from a defect associated either with the natural agent or with
the natural effect.
It’s associated with the agent, indeed, as when the agent suffers a defect
of power, from which it follows that its action is defective and the effect
[of its action] is deficient, . . . [or] from a defect in an instrument or in
anything else that is required for the agent’s action. . . . For an agent
acts by means of both: both its power and an instrument. (10.1940)
Suppose that A’s natural instruments for walking—bones and muscles—are
in perfect condition but that A is drunk, suffering a defect of power. The
alcohol-induced defect in A’s power of walking only partially explains A’s
staggering: A wouldn’t be staggering if A couldn’t walk. “An agent acts not
in so far as power is lacking to it but rather in so far as it has any power, since
if it lacked power entirely, it wouldn’t act at all” (10.1940). The per se cause
of A’s walking and of his staggering is his power in so far as it remains intact.
But that badness in his walking “results from an agent cause only in so far
as it is deficient in power, and in that respect it is not efficient.” “That’s why it’s
said that badness doesn’t have an efficient but  rather a deficient cause”
(10.1940).176 And so A’s power of walking causes his walking per se but his
staggering per accidens.
Explanations of natural badness associated with the effect may be seen
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as concerned with the “anything else that is required for the agent’s action”
mentioned by Aquinas in considering instruments as loci of natural badness
associated with the agent.177 “For if the matter [that enters into the effect] is
not disposed to receive the agent’s impression [of some form], then a
defect necessarily results in the effect” (10.1941)—as when a defect in the
marble results from a defect in the limestone. While this sort of badness
associated with the effect still qualifies as deplorable in varying degrees, the
sort “associated with the form of the effect” (10.1942) is the familiar, funda-
mental, inevitable, scarcely recognizable much less deplorable “badness”
that “occurs per accidens in so far as the privation of another form is neces-
sarily connected with [the acquisition of] any form, as a consequence of
which the corruption of some other thing results from the generation of
any one thing” (10.1942). Summing up this etiology of natural badness in
a way that amends the thesis, “it’s clear in these ways that, where natural
things are concerned, what is bad is caused by what is good, [but] only per
accidens” (10.1943a).
9. How Goodness is the Cause of Badness in Morality
“However,” Aquinas says, “it seems to be otherwise as regards morality”
(10.1944a). Particular  differences  between his accounts of natural and
moral badness emerge in the synopsis of his moral psychology and ethics
which this sentence introduces, as we’ll see. But the broadest difference is
the one  he states  at the  outset, in what amounts  to  a  thoroughgoing
rejection of consequentialism in ethics:
if moral fault178 is carefully considered, it is found to be . . . unlike
[natural badness] . . . in that moral fault is considered in connection
with action alone, and not in connection with any effect brought about [by
action] . . . Therefore, moral fault is considered not on the basis of the
matter or form of the effect but results solely from the agent. (10.1944b)
The only basis Aquinas supplies here for this distinction is a compari-
son of morality with the arts. Like nature itself, “the arts are factive,” or
productive; “that’s why flaws (peccatum) are said to occur in the arts as they
do in nature” (10.1944b), because “art imitates nature in respect of its
operation” (10.1943b). Morality, on the other hand, is “not factive but
active” (10.1944b).179 The principal object of evaluation in the arts and
crafts is the product or effect. On the basis of that principal evaluation the
artisan-agent may well be evaluated, too, as a source of badness (or good-
ness) in the effect; but the action by means of which the artisan brings about
the effect in matter is typically not an object of evaluation at all. It’s only the
outcome of the artisan’s action that counts. In morality, on the other hand,
the immediately accessible object of evaluation is the external action itself,
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rather than any of its effects or consequences. But because the moral bad-
ness or goodness of the action results solely from the agent, the principal
object of moral evaluation is the agent considered just as such—that is, the
agent analyzed into the agent’s internal principles of action.
Since some badness in nature and in the arts also stems from agents,
moral badness is not unlike those other sorts in stemming from the agent
(even though moral badness stems from nothing else). However, before
Aquinas begins his account of the principles of actions that are properly
subject to moral evaluation, he notes a respect in which the evaluation of a
moral agent evidently differs from that of a natural agent, at least as regards
the agent’s active power. “For moral fault,” unlike natural badness, “seems
not to result from a defect of power, since weakness associated with a power
either entirely removes or at least diminishes moral fault” (10.1944a). This
is because a defect in an active power necessitates a corresponding defect in
the associated action; and, as we’ve seen, “a moral fault must be voluntary,
not necessary.” Consequently, “weakness warrants not punishment, which
guilt deserves, but rather mercy and forgiveness” (10.1944a).180 As we shall
see, this mitigating consideration has a role to play in the development of
his etiology of moral badness.
In his occasional allusions to morality earlier in this treatise on badness,
Aquinas seems content simply to identify will as the active principle of moral
and immoral actions.181 Its role is of course essential, but he’s now ready to
explain that “in connection with actions properly subject to moral evaluation
we find four active principles, in an ordered relationship to one another”
(10.1945). Their relationship is complex: one of these principles or powers
somehow moves or is moved by another in the system, but, as we’ll see, a
power moved by another power in one way may move that same power in an-
other way. Suppose we consider an overt action—A’s raising his hand to cast a
vote—and trace the chain of active principles back from the occurrence of
that external physical movement. The internal principle immediately con-
nected with the external movement that is the terminus of A’s action is what
Aquinas calls “the executive power” or “the motive power,” the active princi-
ple “by which various parts of the body are moved to execute will’s command”
(10.1945).182 The motive power appears to be what we would identify as
neurophysiological apparatus of various sorts. Since the motive power is
whatever makes will’s command effective in the agent’s body, “this power is
moved by will, which is another principle” (10.1945).
The motive power’s moving of the body is an instance of efficient
causation, and so is will’s moving of the motive power. But will itself is
an appetitive power,  which must be moved by final causation, as we’ve
seen.183 And so the internal principle that in turn moves will must do
so by providing will with an object that moves it by attracting it as an
end. Consequently, what moves will in this hierarchy of principles is not
some power itself acting directly on will (as will moves the motive power),
but rather “the judgment of an apprehending [or cognitive] power, which
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judges that this or that,” some object apprehended by it, “is good or bad”
(10.1945). The goodness or badness of the object represented to will in
such judgments are the aspects of the object that move will—“one sort
moving it to pursue, the other to avoid” the apprehended object. Finally,
in another instance of efficient causation, “the apprehending power itself
is moved by the apprehended thing” (10.1945). And, as we’ve just been
seeing, in judging that that apprehended thing is good (or bad) for the
agent, the apprehending power makes it an object for will, in that respect
involving even the apprehended thing among the internal principles of
A’s external action.184
So in the full explanation of A’s raising his hand to cast a vote, the first
active principle is (1) the (sound of the reading of the) motion, which is
(2) apprehended by A’s sensory cognition and understood by his intellect
or reason, which judges the motion to be bad and presents it as such to (3)
A’s will, which responds to that evaluated object by moving (4) A’s motive
power to move his arm to vote against the motion.185
In morally evaluating A’s action, it would be a mistake to focus on (4)
the external bodily movement, “for external acts of that sort pertain to
morality only if they are voluntary” (10.1946a), as not every external bodily
movement is. And if, as in A’s case, the external act is voluntary, then the
moral evaluation of it
already presupposes [an evaluation of] moral goodness or badness: . . . if
the act of will is good, then the external act is also called good; but
if the former is bad, the external act is bad. However, if the external
act is defective because of a defect that does not pertain to will [—if A
misheard the voting instructions—] that defect would have nothing to
do with moral badness (malitiam). (10.1946a)
Mishearing “is a fault not of morality but of nature. Therefore, that sort of
defect in the executive power” or in the external act it triggers “either totally
excuses or diminishes moral fault” (10.1946a).
It would be a much more blatant mistake to look for the proper object
of moral evaluation at the other end of this process. (1), “the act by which
a thing moves an apprehending power, is immune from moral fault, since
what is audible moves the sense of hearing (and any object moves any
passive power) in accordance with a natural order” (10.1946b).186 Natural
order is subject to disruption, as in the possibility of A’s mishearing, but the
result is only natural badness.
Offhand, (2), the apprehending, interpreting, and evaluating of the
external object is a much more likely object of moral evaluation. But, as
Aquinas sees it,
even the act of an apprehending power, considered in itself, lacks
moral fault, since a defect in it, like a defect in the executive power,
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excuses or diminishes moral fault. For weakness and ignorance equally
excuse or diminish shortcomings (peccatum).187 Therefore, we’re left
with the conclusion that moral fault is found primarily and principally
in [(3)] an act of will alone. And for that reason, too, it is because an
[external] act is voluntary that it is reasonably called moral or immoral.
Therefore, the root and origin of moral shortcomings is to be sought
in an act of will. (10.1946c–d)
So it’s crucially important to have a precise identification of this act of will.
We’ve already come across a plausible candidate in will’s act of command-
ing the motive power, but I want to postpone trying to decide the issue until
we’ve seen what else Aquinas has to say along these lines.
10. A Difficulty in the Etiology of Moral Badness
Suppose that A’s voting against the motion is morally bad—unjust, let’s
say. Then, as Aquinas points out, “this inquiry seems to give rise to a
difficulty” (10.1947a). His inquiry so far has located the source of the moral
badness of the external act in the agent’s will, which must, therefore, be
thought of as defective in some respect on this occasion. But in what
respect? If the defect in A’s will were natural, he says, it would “always inhere
in the will”; and in that case A’s will, in acting, would “always fall short
(peccabit) morally” (10.1947a). But, he seems to be saying, no human will is
always defective: “acts of virtue show this to be false” (10.1947a). “Therefore,
so that it doesn’t follow that a will falls short in any and every act, we have to
say that the preexisting defect in the will is not natural” (10.1947a).188 The
only apparent alternative is that the defect is voluntary. “However, if the
defect is voluntary, it’s already a moral shortcoming”; and in that case, since
we’re out to identify the source of the moral badness, “its cause will again
remain to be sought; and so reason will fall into an infinite regress”
(10.1947a). In that case, then, the inquiry will after all not have located the
source of the moral badness. If the presence of moral badness is to be
accounted for at all, the defect must be voluntary. Still, “so that we’re not
forced into an infinite regress,” the voluntary defect in A’s will that is the
source of the moral badness in A’s external action must itself be, “nonethe-
less, not a moral shortcoming” (10.1947b). In this perplexing situation,
Aquinas’s next sentence provides a ray of hope: “Of course, we have to
consider just how that can be the case” (10.1947c).
His extension of the inquiry aims at identifying an antecedent defect
in the will that is both voluntary and not a moral defect (even though he’s
just said that “if the defect is voluntary, it’s already a moral shortcoming”).
He sets the stage with an entirely plausible general account of the appropri-
ateness or defectiveness of activity on the part of any secondary agent or
active principle, one that
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acts by means of the power of its primary agent. When a secondary agent
remains ordered under its primary agent, therefore, it acts in a way that
is not defective. But it is defective in acting if it happens to be deflected
from the primary agent’s ordering, as is clear in the case of an instru-
ment when it falls short of the agent’s movement. (10.1948)
Take, for  example, the  badly  tuned piano  that  mars the effect of the
pianist’s flawless movements. The goodness of a secondary active principle
consists in its fulfilling its ordered relationship to the principle or principles
to which it is secondary. A’s motive power, for instance, would be defective
in acting if A’s arm did not go up in response to the command of A’s will.
But, of course, the secondary active principle at issue here isn’t any
external instrument, or A’s motive power, but A’s will. And “in the ordering
associated with actions that are properly subject to moral evaluation” will
has been depicted as ordered under two other principles: “an apprehending
power and the apprehended object, which is the end” (10.1948).189 So
Aquinas appears to be identifying two kinds of relevant defect in a moral
agent’s will: (I) a disruption of its properly ordered relationship to the
apprehending power or (II) a disruption of its properly ordered relation-
ship to the apprehended, evaluated object.190
In this inquiry so far Aquinas has alluded to apprehending powers only
generally, but he now needs to introduce his familiar distinction between two
types of them. “Not just any apprehending power is the mover appropriate
for any appetite, but this one for this one, and another for that one. There-
fore, just as the mover proper for the sensory appetite is the sensory appre-
hending power, so the mover proper for will,” since will is, as he often
remarks, the rational appetite,191 “is reason itself” (10.1948). Consequently,
one source of defect I in an agent’s will is its being confronted with an object
that has been evaluated only by the agent’s sensory cognition, the appre-
hending power to which will is not properly ordered. But mere confrontation
isn’t yet disruption. “A defect in its ordered relationship to reason,” defect I,
actually “occurs, of course, when, for instance, will, in response to a sudden
sensation, tends toward a good that is pleasant in a sensory way” (10.1950)
without regard to the reasonableness of intending that good. In such a case a
will introduces disorder into the system of active principles by allowing itself
to be moved by the judgment of an inappropriate primary agent. Although
Aquinas is not completely explicit about this, it seems clear that a will’s
tending toward—that is, intending—such a good in such circumstances is
always both voluntary and morally bad. And the threatening infinite regress
can be avoided in connection with defect I by distinguishing will’s morally
bad intending of such a good from its not yet morally bad confronting of an
object evaluated by sensory apprehension alone.
Since will is moved by either the sensory or the intellective apprehend-
ing power not directly but only by being presented with an object that
attracts or repels it, there can be relevant disorder in an agent’s system of
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active principles even “when will tends toward action moved by an appre-
hension of reason”  (10.1949). Of  course, if reason’s apprehension  and
judgment result in reason’s “representing a good proper for will,” and will
then actually intends that good, “an appropriate action results. But when
will breaks out into action either [I] in response to an apprehension of the
sensory apprehensive power, or [II] in response to an apprehension of reason
itself representing some other good, different from will’s proper good, then
the result is a moral shortcoming in will’s action” (10.1949).192 For “reason
can apprehend many goods and many ends,” but “the end and primary
mover for will is not just any good but a certain determinate sort of good”
(10.1949). Aquinas does not further specify here the determinate sort of
good that is proper for will, but for present purposes it’s probably enough
to recognize that it must at any rate be a good that it’s rational for the agent
to pursue on a given occasion, all things considered. And not even reason
itself—ordinary, limited human reason—can be guaranteed to represent
that sort of good to will on every occasion.
A defect in will’s ordered relationship to its proper end occurs, how-
ever, when, for instance, reason arrives by [faulty] reasoning at some
good that is, either at this time or in this respect, not good, and will
nonetheless tends toward it as toward its proper good. (10.1950)
So Aquinas’s continuation of his inquiry has identified two kinds of
defect in will that precede any moral shortcoming in a voluntary external
action: “a defect in will’s ordered relationship” either “to reason” (defect I)
or “to its proper end” (defect II) (10.1950). But if these antecedent defects
are to have the sort of explanatory power Aquinas is looking for, each of
them must be voluntary, as we’ve seen. To show that they are voluntary, he
has to provide more detail about will’s powers. In the first place, and most
generally, “it is in the power of will itself to will and not to will” (10.1950).
So, as regards defect I, a will confronted with “a sudden sensation . . . [of]
a good that is pleasant in a sensory way” (10.1950) can refrain from intend-
ing that good. Consequently, if that will does go on to intend that sensory
good without regard to its reasonableness, it does so voluntarily.193 By the
same token, as regards defect II, a will that intends an inappropriate good
presented to it by reason does so voluntarily.
But Aquinas ascribes other, more precisely orientated powers to will
that apply only in connection with defect II in cases in which will remains
properly related to reason: “in the second place, it is in will’s power that
reason actually consider or stop considering, or [in the third place] that
reason consider this, or that” (10.1950). So will’s moving of reason is, like
its moving of the motive power, an instance of efficient causation. A’s will
need not intend any positively evaluated object presented to it even by A’s
reason but can, in theory, always cause reason to stop considering that
object (or objects of that sort), or to consider something else. Consequently,
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if A’s will does go on to intend a good presented to it by A’s reason, it does
so voluntarily, for more reasons than one.
Both kinds of antecedent defect, then, are voluntary, thereby satisfying
the first of the two requirements Aquinas laid down. But if the yawning
infinite regress is to be avoided, each kind of defect must, at some stage of
its development, also be not morally bad. Aquinas’s treatment of this crucial
requirement here is frustratingly terse:
Nonetheless, neither is this defect morally bad. For if reason consid-
ered nothing at all, or considered any good at all, there is no [moral]
shortcoming until will tends toward an inappropriate end—which is
already an act of will.194 (10.1950)
What’s clearest about this passage is its identification of the primordial
morally bad act of will. The act of will in which “the root and origin” of
moral badness in the external act is to be found is even more fundamental
than will’s commanding the motive power. As Aquinas has frequently sug-
gested in this extension of his inquiry, it’s will’s intending—tending to-
ward—an inappropriate good.
And in that light it seems clearer that reason’s considering “nothing at
all” is meant to characterize the morally neutral internal state of affairs that
must precede defect I—will’s being confronted by a good evaluated by sen-
sory apprehension alone—while reason’s considering “any good at all” char-
acterizes the morally neutral precondition of defect II—will’s being
confronted by a good that has been evaluated by reason, correctly or incor-
rectly. The voluntariness of those morally neutral preconditions depends on
will’s powers to alter them: to cause reason to consider the sensory good with
which will is being confronted, to cause reason to stop considering the good
it is representing to will, or to reconsider it, or to consider something else.195
“In this way, therefore, it is clear that, as regards both natural and moral mat-
ters, what is bad is caused, only per accidens, by what is good” (10.1951).
11. The Rest of the Treatise on Badness
Aquinas’s treatise on badness in SCG III occupies chapters 4–15. In my
investigation of the treatise, I’ve focused on the material he develops in
chapters 4–10, although I’ve referred to some relevant passages in the final
six chapters. As I see it, the philosophical climax of the treatise is reached
in III.10, and most of the developments in the remaining chapters are
readily inferable from what’s  already been established.  In  the  light of
Aquinas’s arguments in III.4–10, it should already be clear that “badness is
based on goodness” (III.11), that “badness cannot entirely demolish good-
ness” (12), that “badness does have some sort of cause” (13), that “badness
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is a cause per accidens” (14), and that “there is no consummate badness
(summum malum)” (15).196
Aquinas’s reasons for producing this elaborate treatment of natural
and moral badness at this very early stage of the development of his account
of providence remain to be seen.
IV. GOD AS NATURE’S GOAL
1. Reorientation
At the end of Book III’s first, introductory chapter, Aquinas divides his
projected investigation of divine providence into three big topics, the first
of which he characterizes as having to do with “God himself in so far as
he is the end of all things,” God’s omega-aspect (1.1867b).197 Since III.64
is unmistakably the beginning of Aquinas’s investigation of the second big
topic, God’s universal governance, it looks offhand as if he intends to
devote chapters 2–63 to his treatment of God as the universal goal.198 In
the first two of those chapters Aquinas does carry out a general investiga-
tion of the nature of agents, actions, and ends that makes an altogether
appropriate preamble to a consideration of his thesis that God is (some-
how) the unique, universal, ultimate goal of the actions of created
agents.199 However, as we’ve just seen, Aquinas’s chapters 4 through 15
constitute a treatise on badness. God is mentioned only briefly in the twelve
chapters that make up the treatise, and it’s unclear how, if at all, Aquinas
intends his analysis of badness to contribute to his consideration of God
as goal.200 So, setting aside the uncertainly relevant treatise on badness, it
seems right to say that Aquinas’s investigation of God’s omega-aspect oc-
cupies not III.2–63 but just III.2–3 and 16–63.201 Within that latter series
of chapters, he devotes III.16–24 to God as the goal of created things
generally, the topic of this chapter, and III.25–63 to God as the ultimate
goal of human beings specifically.
In chapter 16, Aquinas resumes the line of development that seems to
have been interrupted by the treatise on badness, and he does so in a way
that apparently acknowledges the interruption. In view of his having argued
in chapter 2 that “every agent acts for an end” and in chapter 3 that “every
agent acts for something good,” it surely looks as if the main reason for
arguing in chapter 16 that “something good is the end of each and every
being” (16.1985) must be to remind the reader of what has already been
established, before the treatise on badness. And, in fact, each of III.16’s four
paragraphs is closely related to one or more paragraphs in III.2 and 3.202
Apparently, then, the primary function of III.16 is to reset the stage for a
resumption of the account of agents, actions, and ends designed to lead to
an explanation and justification of Aquinas’s thesis that God is nature’s
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